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Outfitting a
Big-War Military with
Small-War Capabilities
MICHAEL R. MELILLO

I

t is a never-ending challenge for defense planners to develop the strategy
and policies required to ensure American security when threatened by an enemy. Unfortunately, it took the tragedy of the 9/11 attacks and the challenges
posed by an adaptive enemy for the United States to realize it was not prepared
to fight war on terms other than its own choosing. Looking back now, four
years into the Global War on Terrorism, one can plainly see the US military was
blinded by its preference for conventional war and failed to recognize the threat
posed by irregular enemies. The military culture has long been convinced that
technological overmatch was the prescription for security—a continuation of
the traditional American way of war. However, the character of warfare is
changing.
Interstate wars, while not obsolete, are now less prevalent than direct threats from irregular forces. The US military’s conventional dominance
has forced its enemies to seek other methods to challenge American hegemony. While conventional might is still necessary in an uncertain world, the
American invasion and subsequent operations in Iraq have exposed the US
military’s limitations and instigated changes that will make it more prepared
to meet the growing irregular threat. Only by creating a force that is just as
adept at conducting small wars against irregular enemies as it is at conducting big wars against conventional foes will the United States be able to ensure
security in the 21st century.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has had to adjust to
its role as the world’s only superpower. The Pentagon, while espousing a new
world order, remained fixated on extending its conventional superiority and
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focused on an emergent China as the next near-peer competitor that could
threaten US interests and security. Although events in Somalia, Bosnia,
Rwanda, and Haiti served as clear examples of the unconventional and uncertain challenges the United States would face in the new century, defense planners disregarded their significance. The US military was conditioned by
decades of preparation for conventional interstate war, as well as by its searing experiences in Vietnam and Beirut.1 Emerging threats to American interests posed by ethnic and tribal rivalries, religious zealotry, transnational
terrorism, and illegitimate or brutal governments were seen as nuisances, and
humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, and “nation-building” were considered as “lesser included” missions.2 This tunnel vision prevented defense
planners from recognizing the US military’s vulnerabilities against potential
adversaries who could threaten American interests asymmetrically with irregular forces. The attacks on 9/11 changed that internal calculus, and military planners quickly recognized the need to face a more adaptive enemy.
Irregular enemies are not new to American forces. But today, the US military
is embroiled in Iraq and elsewhere facing a complex global insurgency where
it finds itself struggling to prevail in a type of war in which the enemy employs irregular warfare approaches to achieve its political aims.3
Why, then, is the United States, a country with the most highly skilled,
best equipped, and most professional military in history, having such difficulty
in Iraq? According to one military analyst, it is because American forces have a
culture that seeks to ignore the requirements and challenges of irregular warfare, resulting in a requirement to relearn appropriate techniques with each new
experience with this phenomenon.4 The US military has long equated conventional military operations as the acme of the professional art, ignoring more unconventional approaches. One analyst even castigated the American way of
war as a “Way of Battles.”5 Overcoming this institutional preference for big
wars and a preoccupation with high-technology conventional warfare are paramount for ensuring American military readiness in the future. To meet these
challenges the US military needs to effect a transformation that changes its cultural resistance to nontraditional wars. Transforming the military culture will
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be a difficult task. However, the hard lessons of irregular warfare, as played out
on the streets of Baghdad, Fallujah, and countless other towns in Iraq and elsewhere, are being learned. Capturing those lessons and translating them into
policy, doctrine, force structure, training, and education can produce the transformation essential to the US ability to prevail in the uncertain world it will
continue to face in the 21st century.

The Traditional American Way of War
In his seminal work on American military strategy, The American
Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, Russell
Weigley characterized the traditional American strategy as one focused on a
strategy of annihilation of the enemy.6 He attributed the development of this
approach to America’s great wealth, extensive resources, and unlimited aims,
which together allowed American forces to rely on mass, firepower, and
overwhelming force against its enemies. This strategy began its successful
run with the defeat of Fascism in the mid-20th century and provided a template for how the American military trained, organized, and equipped itself to
win the nation’s wars. This recipe for success was nurtured over a period of 60
years and yielded a US military with a “big war” focus and an affinity for conventional war where its strengths could be exploited.
In the wake of World War II and throughout the Cold War, the United
States established its conventional force structure and doctrine on a foundation of technological superiority as a trade-off for numerical inferiority.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, many defense analysts attributed its demise and the end of the Cold War to the inability of the Kremlin to maintain
pace with the United States’ advancements and costs in high-tech weaponry.7
While this may in fact be true, it also reinforced the belief that technological
superiority was paramount to American security and essential for the United
States to fulfill its role as the world’s sole superpower.
In the decade that followed the Soviet collapse, the US military’s insatiable desire to expand its technological supremacy was further justified by
the successes it achieved in the 1991 Gulf War to liberate Kuwait from Saddam
Hussein and in the liberation of Kosovo from the Serbs in 1999 with air power
alone. These relatively rapid operations conditioned American leaders and
military planners to view wars as conventional, force-on-force operations
where American forces could overwhelm the enemy using high-tech weaponry
and precision firepower to achieve a rapid victory.
By the end of the 20th century, the United States had reached an unquestionable level of dominance in conventional warfare that no potential enemies could challenge militarily. Owing to this sense of unchallenged security,
the US military planned to transform itself to further its military supremacy by
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advancing a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) grounded in information
dominance. This RMA would change war by aiming to minimize, or some
would say eliminate, the “fog of war.” Network-centric warfare (NCW), precision strike, ballistic missile defense, and effects-based operations were among
the latest agenda items to be applied in the American way of war. When the
Bush Administration entered office in 2001, it was committed to transforming
the US military by exploiting technologies that would “skip a generation,” allowing the military to project its power with lighter, more mobile and lethal
forces.8 With no peer competitor to challenge America’s military supremacy,
the Department of Defense planned to take advantage of the “strategic pause”
and focus on transforming the force.
Transformation, in one form or another, has been continuous within
the Defense Department since the end of the Cold War. In practice it has been
understood to mean different things to different parties, but most commonly
transformation has been associated with technological change. The concept
originated in the Soviet Union in the early 1980s. Termed the MilitaryTechnical Revolution by the Soviets, it referred to the impact technology had
on the conduct of war. In the 1990s, Andrew Marshall, head of DOD’s Office
of Net Assessment, advanced the idea, calling it the Revolution in Military
Affairs. He espoused linking new technologies with emerging doctrine and
organizations to make fundamental, far-reaching changes in how the military
conducts operations.9 Today the term RMA has been supplanted by transformation, but its meaning is essentially the same, as it refers to applying new
technologies, concepts, and organizations to bring about radical changes in
the character and conduct of warfare.10 In its broadest context, transformation
is about changing the character and structure of the military to meet the new
security challenges.
The ultimate manifestation of the RMA/transformation efforts in
DOD was evident in the success achieved by US military and Coalition
forces in taking down the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, Special Operations Forces working with the
indigenous Northern Alliance partisans used American airpower to eviscerate the Taliban forces and force the remnants of the government to flee or be
captured. In Iraq, US and British forces raced to Baghdad at unforeseen
speed, overwhelming the Iraqi army and decapitating Saddam’s Ba’athist
regime. These successes of a transformation that enabled the American military to destroy two hostile regimes and defeat two armies so rapidly and
with relatively few forces in succession underscored the foolishness of confronting the United States conventionally. Understanding this, America’s
enemies have adapted and are pursuing asymmetric or irregular approaches
that nullify the US military superiority in order to avoid certain defeat.
Autumn 2006
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A Tale of Two Wars
The Iraq War can be viewed as two wars. The first war, the one the US
military planned for months aimed at removing Saddam’s regime from power,
ended when President Bush announced, “Mission accomplished,” aboard the
USS Abraham Lincoln on 1 May 2003. The magnificent performance by US
forces was a validation of the American way of war. Conventional dominance
and years of preparing to fight enemies on American terms—state against
state, using precision weaponry and highly trained personnel—allowed the
United States to adhere to its strategy of annihilation to achieve its goals with
remarkable speed.
The second war is still under way. Unlike its predecessor, it is not a
traditional war and is the type of war the US military tried to avoid for
years—a counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgencies fall into the category of
“small wars,” which also includes peacekeeping, stability and support operations, and humanitarian missions. Also referred to as low-intensity conflict,
guerrilla war, irregular war, and “savage wars of peace,” among other names,
the term “small war” does not imply the size or intensity of the conflict. Small
wars are instead characterized by the asymmetric nature of the conflict, and
the political outcome sought, and they typically pit a state against a non-state
adversary who does not employ regular forces. Irregular enemies range from
terrorist organizations, criminal groups, and militias to warlord armies and
insurgent movements.11 The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual defines small
wars as “operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military
force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs
of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory
for the preservation of life and of such interests as determined by the policy of
our nation.”12 Victory—or more accurately, success—in this type of war is
much more difficult to determine. Instead of a clearly defined end-state where
one side capitulates, success in these irregular conflicts is measured by the
political outcome that results from the intervention.
Small wars are not new to the American military. Yet despite the nation’s long history in this arena, the American success rate in waging small
wars is far from stellar, particularly since the end of World War II. Thomas X.
Hammes, author of The Sling and the Stone, notes “the only kind of war America has lost” is a small war against an irregular foe, citing Vietnam (1975), Lebanon (1983), and Somalia (1993) to support his point.13 In Iraq today the
asymmetric nature of the conflict presents the greatest challenges to American
conventional forces and undermines the United States’ efforts to provide a stable and secure peace. Instead of jubilation on the streets of Baghdad, American
forces face an insurgency they were neither equipped for nor trained to fight,
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where the effectiveness of high-tech precision weapons is minimized. By intermixing with the local population, employing terror tactics, avoiding direct confrontations with military forces, and seeking to undermine the legitimacy of the
US-backed government, the radical Islamic insurgents have exposed the soft
underbelly of US conventional dominance.
While the initial success of American forces in Iraq validated the traditional American way of war, their experiences since May 2003 reflect the
institutional resistance of defense planners to prepare for the messy tasks associated with peacekeeping, stability operations, and nation-building. The US
military’s ineffectiveness at these types of operations helped create a military
culture that eschewed such operations.14 The reality of the “long war,” however, is that counterinsurgency, stability operations, and nation-building—the
essence of small wars—will dominate the future of warfare.

Shifting the Culture
The American experiences in Iraq over the past three years have
spurred a progression of changes within the US military. While each of the
many changes by itself is by no means transformational, the collective body of
change will have the impact of transforming the military culture from its “big
war” way of thinking to one that is equally adept at conducting small wars. The
scope of change is beginning to affect all aspects of the way American armed
forces approach the business of war, from the strategic to the tactical levels and
affecting overall strategy, doctrine, roles and missions, force structure, training, and education. Over time, as these changes take root and are institutionalized throughout DOD, the US military will expand its dominance beyond
conventional warfare to include the irregular, and thus be more prepared to
meet the uncertain challenges it will certainly face in the 21st century.
Strategy
The recognition of nontraditional threats to American security posed
by irregular enemies is by far the most dramatic paradigm shift in US military
strategy. Whereas the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) acknowledged the possibilities of “lesser contingencies” like Somalia, Bosnia, and
Rwanda, its force planning construct, referred to as “1-4-2-1,” remained focused on conventional, interstate war associated with major combat operations.15 The 2005 QDR identifies irregular warfare as “the dominant form of
warfare confronting the United States,” and its force planning construct places
both homeland defense and irregular warfare on an equal footing with conventional warfighting. Moreover, it requires the services to maintain essential
warfighting capabilities but also directs them to place greater emphasis on
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meeting irregular challenges such as conducting counterinsurgency and stability operations.16
In his book, The Pentagon’s New Map, Thomas Barnett details his experiences as a DOD analyst in the 1990s and describes the general aversion of
the military to what he termed the “lesser includeds” or, more accurately, small
wars. Employing American forces to perform nation-building or stability operations was commonly viewed as detrimental to the purpose of the military.
Consequently, although the 1990s offered several opportunities for US forces
in this realm—Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti, to name a few—there was little interest or enthusiasm to capture and institutionalize the core competencies required for these “operations other than war.” Furthermore, when the Bush
Administration entered office, the military services expected to be relieved of
the distractions of nation-building. In the 2000 campaign, then-Governor Bush
stated the military should not be used for “unclear military missions” or serve
as “permanent peacekeepers, dividing warring parties.”17
The lessons of Iraq have proven otherwise. While military planners
prefer to view the postwar reconstruction as the purview of the State Department, the United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations, the unfortunate reality is that within the US government, only the military possesses the
expeditionary capability to deploy to austere (or war-ravaged) environments
and sustain itself while providing the requisite assistance to restore order and
promote US interests. Appropriately, the Defense Department released a new
directive on “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations,” establishing stability operations as “a core US military
mission.” This shift in policy is aimed at eliminating the conditions that allow
irregular forces to thrive. Stabilization allows free markets, the rule of law, religious tolerance, and effective governance to take root, thereby promoting
an environment favorable to US interests. The directive acknowledges that
while many stability tasks “are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or US
civilian professionals . . . [military forces] successfully performing such tasks
can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate timely withdrawal of US and
foreign forces.”18
Doctrine
Coinciding with the emergence of stability operations as a core military mission has been the development of counterinsurgency doctrine within
the armed forces. In Iraq the inability (or neglect) to plan for post-conflict operations arguably allowed the Islamic insurgency and sectarian fissures to
grow during the summer of 2003. The United States was reluctant to recognize that an insurgency was developing and chose to believe the violence was
the work of disaffected Ba’athists, jihadists, and terrorists. As the violence in
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Iraq intensified, the source became clearer—an insurgency committed to discrediting the United States and the new Iraqi government it helped establish.
The American response to the insurgency evolved as the US military
relearned the hard lessons of counterinsurgency warfare. Different strategies
were applied in different sectors of the country. In 2003 and 2004, one common
American response was to kill or capture the insurgents using a heavy-handed
approach. Employing “cordon and sweep” operations, Army forces detained
thousands of Iraqis in attempts to capture insurgents. While this method is appealing to a force that is well-suited for conventional operations, it is counterproductive to success in counterinsurgency warfare. A major aim of counterinsurgency warfare is to gain and maintain the support of the populace—the
center of gravity in a counterinsurgency operation. The application of force often resulted in alienating the very people who the Americans sought to win the
support of and protect. In contrast, the 101st Airborne Division, commanded
by then-Major General David Petraeus, had success in northern Iraq by focusing less on “kinetic” approaches and more on winning the population’s trust by
improving local governance and economic conditions.19
The opposing approaches show the learning process for a military that
had all but mastered the art and science of conventional warfare, but had forgotten the lessons of its past. The Vietnam War, America’s last counterinsurgency war, was perceived as an anathema to the military, which preferred to
expunge it from its institutional memory rather than embrace its lessons.20
Today the US military is experiencing a generational metamorphosis as it grapples with relearning past lessons in counterinsurgency. The Small Wars Manual, originally written in 1940, has been dusted off and is required reading on
most professional reading lists relating to counterinsurgency and stability operations. This represents a major cultural shift in the military. Avoiding this
type of small war is no longer possible, since irregular enemies have learned
not to confront US forces conventionally. At Fort Leavenworth’s Combined
Arms Center, the Army, with the support of the Marine Corps, is resurrecting
and updating its counterinsurgency doctrine. Incorporating the vast and rich
heritage in small wars (including Vietnam) with the lessons from the soldiers
and marines with recent experience in Iraq and elsewhere, the Army has produced new doctrine in draft Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Although
this new doctrine alone will not bring success in Iraq, it does indicate the US
military’s ability to learn as an institution and demonstrates the recognition of
nation-building and counterinsurgency as central tasks for the US armed
forces, as it offers its own reflection on future warfare:
America’s conventional military superiority makes it likely that many of our
enemies will choose insurgency rather than conventional combat when at-

Autumn 2006

29

tempting to achieve their political objectives through the use of force. The
Army and Marine Corps pride themselves on their system of lessons learned:
we must understand that others study us no less carefully than we study them.
Future opponents have already drawn lessons—and comfort—from our perceived missteps and errors in Afghanistan and Iraq, and before that in Somalia,
Vietnam, and elsewhere. The better we understand the principles, imperatives,
and paradoxes of counterinsurgency, the more likely we are able to assist in the
accomplishment of our national objectives through proper management of violence, as well as by contributing in other mission areas facilitating the stabilizing and reconstructing of host states.21

Roles, Missions, and Force Structure
The past four years of war have highlighted capability mismatches
between the existing force structure and the forces required to prosecute the
“long war.” Dr. Williamson Murray and Major General Robert Scales articulated the dilemma facing the US forces in the closing chapter of their book,
The Iraq War: “While the stability mission in Iraq is manpower-intensive, the
forces responsible for performing the mission form a very thin line indeed. Infantrymen bear most of the burden. Yet Army and Marine grunts make up less
than four percent of America’s military, a force only slightly larger than the
New York City Police Department.”22
Each of the services has been forced to adapt to the realities of irregular warfare. As the character of war changes, it is inevitable that the forces
used to wage war must change as well. The Army, Marine Corps, and Special
Operating Forces who face the unknown irregular adversary every day experience the demands of the ongoing counterinsurgency and stability operations, and of small wars in general, most directly. But even the Air Force and
Navy, each of which remains primarily focused on traditional threats, have
stepped up to nonstandard roles like providing installation security and conducting convoy operations to offer relief to the overstretched ground forces.
The Army is in the midst of its most radical reorganization since
World War II. By converting from a division-based structure to one centered
on a brigade-sized unit of action that possesses organic combat, combat support, and sustainment capabilities, the Army will have 42 deployable brigade
combat teams in the active component and 28 in the reserves, increasing its
combat power by 30 percent from its former division-based structure. Moreover, by incorporating organic combat support and combat service support
into the brigade structure, the unit will be able to deploy more rapidly and
fight upon arrival.23 In addition to its conversion to a brigade-based force, the
Army, recognizing the importance of military police and civil affairs capabilities in stability and counterinsurgency operations, has reorganized excess
capability in artillery, engineer, and air defense units—legacies of the Cold
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War—to perform those functions so critical in stability and counterinsurgency operations.
The Marine Corps, having a rich small wars legacy surviving from
its years of conducting the “Banana Wars” in the Caribbean and Central
America, has had to shift its emphasis away from its own conventional war
focus. A much smaller force than the Army, it does not have the depth of
forces to retool artillery units for permanent use as civil affairs groups or military police battalions. Instead it has retrained its more conventionally oriented units to perform infantry, military police, and civil affairs missions.
Relying on an ethos that “every marine is a rifleman” allows a high degree of
adaptability for nonstandard missions. Since the end of the conventional
phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Marine Corps has routinely employed
its artillerymen, air defenders, tank drivers, cooks, and band members in
combat jobs more closely associated with the infantry specialty. Additionally, it established a Foreign Military Training Unit to provide cadres to
assist foreign militaries in preventing crises and promoting stability in their
respective countries, a task more closely associated with the already taxed
Army Special Forces.
US Special Operating Forces (SOF) have proven their tremendous
utility in prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism. Assigned the lead in planning, synchronizing, and, when directed, executing operations against al
Qaeda and its associated terrorist network, US Special Operation Command
is no longer considered just a force provider to the combatant commanders
and has emerged as key player in combating irregular threats. British strategist Colin Gray describes SOF as “entering a golden era” in a world dominated more by irregular than conventional war.24 To meet the increased
demands of irregular warfare, the 2005 QDR announced a 15 percent increase
in Special Operations Forces, including a 33 percent increase in Army Special Forces battalions, an increase of 3,500 personnel in psychological operations and civil affairs units, the establishment of a 2,600-marine special
operations component, increased SEAL team force levels, and the establishment of an SOF unpiloted aerial vehicle squadron. Moreover, the strategy
document calls for conventional forces to be capable of performing missions
more typically associated with SOF, which, ostensibly, will free up some Special Operations Forces for the more challenging unconventional and complex
tasks only they are trained to perform.25
Training and Education
The lesson being driven home by the American experience in Iraq is
that people, not machines or technology, will be the deciding factor in success
or failure. The strategy, doctrine, and organizational structures will provide
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the framework, but only the men and women executing the American strategy
can affect the outcome. In Iraq and in small wars in general, the complexity
and irregular nature of the conflict places a premium on small-unit leaders
who possess the resourcefulness, initiative, and determination to succeed on
a battlefield fraught with uncertainty and where the only certainty is ambiguity. General Charles Krulak, former Marine Corps Commandant, coined the
term “strategic corporal” to describe the phenomenon where the decisions of
junior officers and noncommissioned officers project strategic consequences. Developing leaders who can excel in the complex environment of Iraq
and elsewhere has caused a myriad of changes to the training and education
systems in the US military.
Within the training arena, the Army and Marine Corps have undergone a dramatic shift in emphasis. Before the Iraq experience, training exercises focused on developing conventional warfighting skills centered on
combined arms and mechanized warfare. The Marine Corps’ Combined
Arms Exercises (CAX) and the Army’s National Training Center (NTC) rotations were the centerpieces of unit preparation and readiness for combat.
While the importance of such training is still highly valued, the services have
reengineered their predeployment training regimen to include more relevant
training involving scenarios to develop individual and collective skills for
counterinsurgency and stability operations. “Mojave Viper,” a considerably
more comprehensive and realistic scenario-based training environment for
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, has replaced the traditional CAX program.26 At the NTC in Fort Irwin, the Army spends nearly $230 million annually to provide world-class training across a wide range of scenarios from
kidnapping and car bombs to reacting to sectarian uprisings and conducting
negotiations with village leaders and imams. The OPFOR (opposing force)
is composed of a training cadre of 1,600 role players, including 250 IraqiAmericans, who conduct the scenarios in 12 simulated villages at the remote
Mojave Desert training complex.27 Realistic training scenarios presented during Mojave Viper and the NTC training exercises provide US forces with
opportunities to develop and hone tactics, techniques, and procedures for
typical missions they will conduct in Iraq.
Complementing the revised training programs are the changes that
are occurring in the services’ professional military education programs.
While training prepares military personnel to act, professional military education teaches them how to think, a much-needed skill in conducting irregular
warfare. At the service colleges where captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels study the art and science of war, the post-conflict Iraq experience of the
students has driven the curricula toward a much greater emphasis on irregular
warfare and counterinsurgency operations. Each of the service colleges has
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expanded its program of instruction to include more study of past counterinsurgencies. Elective offerings on counterinsurgency at the Army Command
and General Staff College are filled to capacity, and the officer-students are
devoting much of their time to the literature on counterinsurgency and stability operations. The war in Iraq has begun to provoke a cultural shift within the
Army, especially among the company-grade and junior field-grade officers,
from its predilection for large tank battles to an acceptance that the future will
require an Army capable of conducting the extremely difficult tasks associated with counterinsurgency operations.28
The lessons learned in Iraq have shown that to be effective, the US
military must balance its well-developed ability to apply force with compassion and understanding of the local indigenous population. This basis tenet of
counterinsurgency has underscored the importance of cultural awareness as a
key component of the struggle for the “hearts and minds” of the people. One
example of the services’ efforts in this area is the Marine Corps’ new Center for
Advanced Operational Culture Learning. Opened in May 2005, it is designed
to facilitate language training and, more important, cultural education throughout the service by incorporating language familiarization and operational culture training into the curricula at each of the Marine Corps’ service schools,
through distance education, and with pre-deployment programs. Eventually
the Marine Corps aims to assign all career service members specific regions of
study to improve this critical capability.29 Other cultural awareness programs
also are on the rise within the US military. Within the Army, all soldiers deploying to Iraq undergo a thorough cultural awareness program to ensure they understand and respect the nuances of Arab-Islamic culture. More formally, the
Army has expanded its Foreign Area Officer program to meet the expanded requirements for staff-level cultural and linguistic experts. The Air Force will begin requiring all majors to study certain foreign languages during their formal
intermediate-level schooling to have a credible language and cultural capability in the regions most likely to present future challenges.

Conclusion
The US military is the most powerful, best equipped, and most
highly trained fighting force in the world. But as it has learned over the past
four years, it was not ideally structured, prepared, or conditioned for the challenges posed by enemies employing irregular warfare tactics. Fighting insurgents who use terrorism, kidnappings, and sabotage, and who incite sectarian
violence, is much different from engaging conventional military forces
across expanses of desert or on the plains of Europe, where a superior force
can exploit its technological advantages to achieve a decisive military victory
Autumn 2006

33

over its enemies. As a result of the US experience in Iraq, a reexamination of
US strategy has yielded a myriad of changes aimed at developing the capabilities required to succeed in small wars. To the pure disciple of the “big war”
military, the changes within the Defense Department may appear to be an
abandonment of what has allowed the US military to thrive since World War
II. However, the strategy and guidance provided in the 2005 QDR report portend an adjustment to, rather than a departure from, previous approaches to
national defense.
The war in Iraq may be an indication of the types of war the United
States will face in the future. What started out as a conventional conflict for
America and its Coalition partners has since evolved into a counterinsurgency
war or small war in which success will be measured more by the political outcome rather than the destruction of the opposing military force. In his book,
Another Bloody Century, Colin Gray sees the character of warfare blurring
in the 21st century, contending, “Future warfare must be assumed to encompass both regular [conventional] and irregular conflict.”30 Lieutenant General
James Mattis, who commanded the 1st Marine Division in Iraq from the war’s
start through the summer of 2004, believes future wars will be characterized by
the confluence of different modes and means of war. To him, the choice between conventional and nontraditional wars is a false option set. The US military will face both, perhaps simultaneously in the same battlespace. These
“hybrid wars” will challenge American forces to be equally adept at defeating
irregular foes as they are at defeating traditional conventional enemies.31
The strategic environment the United States faces today, and will
continue to face in the future, requires defense planners to recognize “that
their vision of future warfare cannot be neatly, conveniently, and economically captured by a single paradigm.”32 Conventional conflict between states
is not obsolete, but its occurrence may be less likely in the foreseeable future.
The American military is in the midst of a transformation, but not one tied to
technology and the traditional American way of war. Instead, it is transforming its culture to understand that war is a “come-as-you-are” affair, and the
enemy truly does “get a vote” in determining the type of war to be fought. In
order to continue to ensure American security in the decades to come, the
American military must be capable of thriving across the entire spectrum of
conflict, from the large, conventional conflicts it prefers to the irregular small
wars that are prevalent today.
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